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Existing side-channel analysis techniques require a leakage model, in the form of a prior knowledge or a set of training data, to
establish a relationship between the secret data and the measurements. We introduce side-channel analysis with reinforcement learning
(SCARL) capable of extracting data-dependent features of the measurements in an unsupervised learning approach without requiring
a prior knowledge on the leakage model. SCARL consists of an auto-encoder to encode the information of power measurements
into an internal representation, and a reinforcement learning algorithm to extract information about the secret data. We employ a
reinforcement learning algorithm with actor-critic networks, to identify the proper leakage model that results in maximum inter-cluster
separation of the auto-encoder representation. SCARL assumes that the lower order components of a generic non-linear leakage model
have larger contribution to the leakage of sensitive data. On a lightweight implementation of the Ascon authenticated cipher on the
Artix-7 FPGA, SCARL is able to recover the secret key using 24K power traces during the key insertion, or Initialization Stage, of the
cipher. We also demonstrate that classical techniques such as DPA and CPA fail to identify the correct key using traditional linear
leakage models and more than 40K power traces.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Physical exposure of Internet-of-Things (IoT) and mobile devices in unprotected environments enables the class of
physical attacks, called side-channel analysis, that compromise the security of computing systems when an attacker has
access to the hardware platform. While standardized cryptographic algorithms are generally secure against classical
cryptanalysis, the run-time signatures of devices executing an algorithm can expose information about the processed
secret data. Side-channel analysis (SCA) refers to attack techniques that attempt to recover the secret key of cryptographic
algorithms by inspecting the signatures of a hardware platform. The most common signatures of hardware exploited in
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SCA include the power consumption [20, 23] and electromagnetic (EM) radiations of the device processing the secret
data [19].
Side-channel analysis techniques that use the power consumption of the hardware under attack to recover the secret
key are often called power analysis (PA). A typical power analysis technique requires a leakage model and proper
statistics to measure the goodness of fit into the model. The leakage model establishes a mathematical relationship
between the power consumption of the device and the processed secret data. In a PA attack, the secret data is calculated
from the input and/or output of the algorithm, e.g. plaintext and/or ciphertext in an encryption/decryption algorithm,
and a subset of the secret key. Using the statistics, the attacker measures how well the relationship between the power
measurements and the calculated secret data fits into the leakage model, for every possible value of the key subset. The
correct key exhibits the highest rank according to the statistics.
Traditional PA techniques can be divided into two categories of model-based and profiling attacks, depending on
how much prior knowledge on the leakage model is required. Model-based techniques assume a full knowledge of the
attacker on the leakage model. These techniques differ in the statistics they employ for evaluating the goodness of fit into
the model. Differential power analysis (DPA) [15] uses clustering as a goodness of fit, in which the difference between
the mean of power traces in two clusters is used as the statistical relation to rank the key candidates [15]. Alternative
statistics include Pearson’s correlation coefficient in correlation power analysis (CPA) [6], mutual information analysis
(MIA) [43] and KolmogorovâĂŞSmirnov (KS) statistics [9].
The most common traditional leakage model is the Hamming weight (Hw) of the binary data in which the power
consumption of a logic block is correlated with the Hw of the computation result [2, 25]. Further, Hamming Distance (HD)
between the initial and final values of memory elements is popular in modeling the power consumption corresponding
to memory transitions, e.g. in registers of microprocessors [11]. The toggling activity, or switching glitches, of internal
nodes in the gate-level implementation of logic functions, which depends on the processed data, constitute alternative
leakage models [31].
Profiling PA attacks address the issue of model uncertainty by estimating the proper leakage model using a training,
or reference, set. The reference set consists of pairs of power measurements and the corresponding known secret
data collected from a hardware platform identical to the device under attack. Template attack (TA) [7] is a classical
example of a profiling technique in which a multivariate Gaussian distribution is fitted on the power traces in the
reference set. The parameters of the distribution function, i.e. the mean and covariance matrix, depends on the secret
data. Maximum likelihood (ML) or maximum a posteriori (MAP) statistics are used to evaluate the goodness of fit of the
power measurements from the device under attack.
Machine learning techniques have been widely used in profiling attacks to estimate the proper leakage model and
establish goodness of fit statistics. Support vector regression (SVR) [12] and multi-layer perceptron (MLP) neural
networks have been employed [45] to develop a generic non-linear model. A partition-based approach, using k-means
clustering, is also used in [42] to identify a set of values of the secret data that result in similar power traces. Given the
extracted leakage model, classical statistics, such as correlation coefficient, mutual information or ML/MAP metrics can
be used as the rank statistics. Alternatively, machine learning techniques including support vector machine (SVM) [4],
decision tree (DT) or random forest (RF) [3, 17], have been employed to evaluate the goodness of fit.
An emerging class of profiling SCA techniques is based on supervised deep learning. In these techniques, the leakage
estimation and goodness of fit evaluation are integrated into a single algorithm based on a deep neural network (DNN).
During training, the neural network extracts the most relevant features from the power traces that correspond to the
secret data. The feature extraction is equivalent to leakage model estimation. The loss function of the neural network,
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e.g. the cross-entropy loss, serves as the goodness of fit statistic. The problem of deep learning based SCA (DL-SCA)
then reduces to training a DNN, with a proper architecture, that results in the minimum loss during inference, or test.
Convolutional neural networks (CNN), long short-term memory (LSTM) networks, stacked autoencoders and deep
MLP networks have been investigated in [22, 40, 47], which show improved performance over profiling attacks using
classical machine learning techniques.
Supervised learning SCA attacks are powerful if proper a training set, collected from a hardware platform identical
to the device under attack, is available. This is a major limitation of supervised learning techniques. An alternative
approach is using unsupervised learning to extract the leakage model from the measurements. An SCA attack based
on unsupervised learning and sensitivity analysis is introduced in [28]. The leakage model, either in the form a prior
knowledge or a training set, constitutes side information required in existing SCA techniques to retrieve information
about the secret data. Unsupervised learning SCA attempts to recover the secret data based on the assumption that all
information about the secret is included in the measurements, given the input and/or output of the algorithm. This
assumption has significant implications for the security of hardware platforms; the access to the input or output of the
algorithm with the corresponding power measurements is all that is required to recover the secret key. This assumption
does not hold for the supervised learning SCA.
In this paper, we introduce side-channel analysis with reinforcement learning (SCARL) that recovers the secret data
from power measurements without requiring a leakage model or training set. SCARL assumes that the lower order terms
in a non-linear model have the main contribution to the leakage of the secret data. We introduce a regularized maximum
likelihood autoencoder, with LSTM neural networks, that extracts maximum information from the power measurements.
We employ reinforcement learning, using actor-critic networks, to divide the measurements into two clusters based on
pronounced features of the autoencoder, i.e. the features that exhibit the highest inter-cluster difference. Using only the
lower order terms in a generic non-linear leakage model, estimated from the clustered measurements, the correct key
shows the highest inter-cluster difference of at least one of the pronounced features.
Recent standardization processes, such as the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Lightweight
Cryptography (LWC) Standardization Process, require assessment of the security of hardware implementations of
cryptographic algorithms against side-channel analysis. The NIST competition is currently evaluating the security of
authenticated ciphers and hash functions for future lightweight standards. The Ascon authenticated cipher is selected for
the second round of the competition and was introduced during the Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security,
Applicability and Robustness (CAESAR) as the first choice for the lightweight use case. We demonstrate the success of
SCARL in recovering the 128-bit secret key of Ascon using power measurements during S-box computations in the first
round of the key insertion, or Initialization Stage, from a register transfer level (RTL) hardware implementation on an
Artix-7 FPGA.
Our contributions in this work include: 1) Demonstration of the ability of reinforcement learning, in the context of
SCA, to extract secret data in a self-supervised approach; 2) Introduction of a regularized maximum-likelihood LSTM
autoencoder, and demonstration that the information content of raw measurements, distributed over multiple samples,
are encoded into its internal feature while it also provides a denoising effect; 3) Empirical demonstration that not only
does SCARL not require prior knowledge on the leakage model, but that it is also significantly more efficient than
model-based attacks on the Ascon authenticated cipher; and 4) Demonstration that the power consumption during
S-box computations in the Initialization Stage of Ascon leaks secret information that can be used to recover the entire
secret key.
Manuscript submitted to ACM
4 K. Ramezanpour, P. Amapdu and W. Diehl
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A brief introduction to the mathematical background of SCA techniques
and deep learning SCA is presented in Section 2. In Section 3, we introduce the LSTM autoencoder and show that it
extracts information content of all power samples. The SCARL attack with a description of the RL algorithm is provided
in Section 4. The practical implementation of attack on Ascon is explained in Section 5, and the experimental results
are shown in Section 6. The paper concludes in Section 7.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
2.1 Attack Model
In a typical power side-channel analysis, the power consumption corresponding to a key-dependent operation is used
to recover the secret key. Assume the cipher operation Fk () : Fn2 → Fm2 maps known input data Z ∈ Fn2 to an unknown
intermediate variable X ∈ Fm2 , called the sensitive or secret data, in which k is a subset of the secret key. The function
Fk () usually involves a non-linear, or confusion, operation in a cryptographic algorithm for a successful key recovery. In
most block ciphers, the confusion operation is the so-called substitution layer, or S-box. One class of PA techniques
uses the power consumption during the computation of Fk () to find the secret data X . Other techniques inspect the
power consumption when the variable X is loaded into a memory element in the hardware.
In a cryptographic algorithm, the mutual information between the secret data and the known input/output of the
operation under attack, i.e. Fk (), is zero when the secret key is unknown. Formally,H (x¯r |Z ) = H (x¯r ) in whichH () is the
Shannon entropy and x¯r is an arbitrary combination of r ∈ [1,m] bits in the binary representation x¯ = (xi )i=0,1, · · · ,m
of the secret data X . When the key k is unknown, i.e. uniformly distributed with maximum entropy, the distribution
of x¯r is also uniform for a given Z . Hence, the mutual information between Z and X is zero. In power analysis, it is
assumed that the mutual information between a measured power trace T ∈ RN and the secret data x¯ is nonzero; i.e.,
I (T; x¯) > 0, in which I (a;b) is the mutual information between random variables a and b.
The above properties constitute the core of power analysis techniques. A set of input data Z with the corresponding
power traces T, measured during the computation of X = Fk (Z ), is available. For every possible value of the key k ,
the values of the secret data X corresponding to a set of known input Z are calculated. Let x¯k∗ denote the binary
representation of the output of the operation Fk () with a key candidate k∗. If k∗ is the correct key, we have I (T; x¯k∗ ) > 0
which is the basic assumption in side-channel analysis. However, with an incorrect value of the key, I (T; x¯k∗ ) = 0.
This can be inferred from the fact that x¯k∗ is uniformly distributed for different values of k∗. If we take the mutual
information for ranking the key candidates, the correct key exhibits the highest rank.
The binary representation of the secret data is not convenient for power analysis, since, the power consumption is not
necessarily correlated with the individual bits of the data. The numerical normal form [44] is a generic representation of a
Boolean variable that captures the bit dependencies of the data. In this form, them-bit Boolean variable x¯ = (xi )i=0,1, · · · ,m
is represented by the monomials XU =
∏m
i=1 x
ui
i of degree d = HW (U ), in which, U ∈ Fm2 \{0} and HW (U ) is the
Hamming weight of U . To define the mutual information between the power traces and the secret data, the leakage
function L() : Fm2 → R is introduced to map the Boolean space of the data to the real-valued space of power
measurements. A generic leakage model thus can be defined as
L(X ) = α0 +
∑
U ∈Fm2 \{0}
αUX
U + ϵ (1)
in which αU ∈ R,U ∈ Fm2 are real-valued coefficients of the model, and ϵ is a noise term.
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Model-based power analysis techniques are based on finding the maximum correlation between the data leakage
of (1) and the power measurements. The mutual information between L(X ) and power traces T, i.e. I (T;L(X )), is used
as the rank statistics in MIA. To calculate the mutual information empirically, the histogram of the measurements
and the leakage can be used to estimate the joint and marginal distributions. Alternatively, in a clustering-based MIA,
the power traces are clustered according to the leakage model. The difference between the Shannon entropy of the
power traces and the average conditional entropy of traces in the clusters provides the mutual information between
measurements and data [43].
The mutual information rank statistics involve a logarithm function that is sensitive to noise and estimation errors.
Rather than entropy of measurements, KolmogorovâĂŞSmirnov (KS) statistics calculate the difference between the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the measurements and their conditional CDF given data. Assume C denotes
a set of clusters of measurements corresponding to particular values of data, the KS statistics for ranking the key
candidates k∗ is
RKS (k∗) = Ec ∈C
[
sup
t
FT(t) − FT(t |L(X ) ∈ c)] (2)
in which EC is the expectation over C and FT(.) is the CDF of power traces T. The KS rank as defined in (2) can be
considered as a measure for the mutual information between measurements and data. As shown in [43], the KS rank is
more robust than the empirical mutual information in the presence of measurement noise.
According to the KS statistics, the correct key exhibits the highest difference between the measurement distribution,
i.e. FT(t), and the cluster distribution (conditional distribution given a cluster), i.e. FT(t |L(X ) ∈ c). We know that
FT(t) =
∑
c ∈C
FT(t |L(X ) ∈ c)P{L(X ) ∈ c} (3)
Hence, we can consider the CDF of the measurements as the mean of cluster distributions; thus, the KS statistics are the
average difference between the cluster distributions and the mean. Further, since FT(t) is the mean distribution, we have
∀t ,∃ c1, c2 ∈ C : FT(t |L(X ) ∈ c1) < FT(t), FT(t |L(X ) ∈ c2) > FT(t) (4)
As a conclusion, the maximum difference between the cluster distributions and the mean implies maximum inter-cluster
difference. The inter-cluster difference is the most popular rank statistic in the literature of clustering model-based
techniques. According to the above discussion, the inter-cluster difference is a measure for the information content of
the power measurements about the secret data. However, rather than the CDF function, it is more convenient to use the
statistical moments of the measurements in practice. In first-order attacks, the difference between the first moments, i.e.
the mean, of power measurements in the clusters is used to rank the key candidates. Higher order moments has also
been used as a measure for inter-cluster difference [26, 37].
2.2 Dimensionality Reduction
The power traces T = {ti |i = 0, 1, · · · ,N − 1} are N -dimensional real-valued vectors corresponding to N samples of
the power consumption during computation of the secret variable X . However, the domain of data leakage in (1) is the
one-dimensional real space. Classical model-based techniques, such as DPA and CPA, assume that one sample of the
power traces conveys information about the secret data. In other words,
∃ i : 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1, I (ti ;L(X )) > 0 (5)
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This is the main assumption in sample-based techniques; they assume the information about the secret data is concen-
trated on one sample of the power traces, the so-called point of interest (POI). As a result, if the information of the
secret data is distributed over multiple samples, these techniques require an excessively large number of measurements
to identify the correct data, since only part of the information is observed. Further, the measurement noise might
constructively add to a large inter-cluster difference of a power sample different from the POI when an incorrect key
candidate is used for clustering.
One solution to extract information content of the measurements distributed over multiple dimensions (samples of
power traces) is to use a dimensionality reduction algorithm. Principal component analysis (PCA) is widely used in SCA
techniques based on classical machine learning algorithms for this purpose [17]. Assume a number of S power traces
Tj , j = 1, 2, · · · , S are available. The eigenvector decomposition of the sample covariance matrix of the measurements is
obtained as CTT = QΛQt , in which, Λ is a diagonal matrix containing the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix and the
columns of matrix Q are the orthonormal eigenvectors. Let the eigenvalues be denoted by λ0 ≥ λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λN−1
with the corresponding eigenvectors qi , i = 0, 1, · · · ,N − 1. The eigenvalue λi represents the variance, or power, of the
measurements in the direction of qi .
The set of eigenvectors of the covarince matrix in PCA constitute an orthonormal basis that spans the space of
measurements. The eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue is the direction with the largest information
content in the measurements. Assuming the variance of measurement noise is σ 2n , the i-th eigenvalue is λi = σ 2T ,i + σ
2
n ,
in which σ 2T ,i is the power (variance) of the signal in the direction of qi . As a result, the signal to noise ratio (SNR)
in the i-th direction can be obtained as λi/σ 2n = 1 + SNRi . This implies that measurement noise is dominant in the
directions with smaller eigenvalues resulting in larger estimation errors using the components of the measurements in
these directions.
In PCA, a power trace T is projected onto the direction of the eigenvectors with larger eigenvalues which constitute
the principal components of the measurements. The power traces are, hence, represented by the components Ti =
Ttqi , i < N − 1. Instead of individual samples of the power traces, as in relation (5), we now assume that at least one
of the principal components Ti has large mutual information with the secret data. We point out that every principal
componentTi is now a (linear) function of all samples of the power traces. Further, since the measurements are projected
onto directions with larger SNR, the effect of noise is reduced.
While PCA captures distributed information and reduces the effect of noise, it has major limitations undesirable for
SCA. First, PCA requires calculating the sample covariance matrix. This implies that the measurements are precisely
aligned, hence, the attacker must have precise control over the timing of the hardware under attack. Second, PCA is
a linear mapping from the measurements to a reduced dimension space. Therefore, it limits the space of all possible
mappings to a small space of linear functions. We employ an autoencoder, based on deep neural networks, as a
dimensionality reduction function with the following advantages; 1) Deep neural networks can model a large set of
nonlinear functions thus providing a more generic mapping to a reduced-dimension space; 2) We demonstrate that the
autoencoder extracts the maximum information content of the measurements while it also reduces the noise; 3) The
autoencoder does not require precise alignment of measurements.
2.3 Deep Learning SCA (DL-SCA)
In supervised DL-SCA techniques, all stages of power analysis, i.e. dimensionality reduction, leakage estimation and
rank statistics, are implemented with a single DNN. An abstract representation of DL-SCA techniques is shown in
Fig. 1. A typical DNN consists of multiple hidden layers that successively extract information from the measurements.
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Fig. 1. Abstract representation of a typical deep learning SCA (DL-SCA) technique for mapping information of power measurements
to secret data.
In the first layers of the DNN, the information of measurements, distributed over multiple samples, is extracted. The
intermediate layers provide a compact representation of the information, equivalent to dimensionality reduction in
classical machine learning. The final layers map the extracted information to the space of secret data, equivalent to
leakage estimation. The cost function of the DNN serves as a measure for the goodness of fit.
A supervised DL-SCA requires a training set consisting of power measurements with the corresponding secret data.
The important point in training the DNN is choosing the proper representation of the Boolean secret data that serves
as the labels in the training process. The most popular label is the one-hot encoding in which anm-bit binary data is
represented as a vector of sizeM = 2m denoted by l = (l0, l1, · · · , lM ). For a secret variable X = j ∈ Fm2 , we have lj = 1
and li = 0, i , j. This encoding is widely used in DL-SCA [21, 40, 41]. The DNN is trained to generate outputs which
are as close as possible to the labels.
The one-hot encoding of data is popular in multi-class learning problems where the last (output) layer of the DNN
involves a softmax activation function. The output of the softmax function is a vector ofM real values in [0, 1] such
that the sum of the values is equal to 1. As such, the output of the softmax function can be considered as a probability
mass function. In this interpretation, the j-th output of softmax is equivalent to the probability that the input powers
corresponds to the data value X = j. The cross-entropy between the labels and the output of the softmax is used as the
loss function for training the DNN. The cross-entropy loss also serves as the goodness of fit statistic during inference.
The labels used for representing the secret data in DL-SCA has significant effect on the leakage model estimated by
the DNN. Using one-hot encoding implies that the power consumption corresponding to different values of the secret
data are distinct. As a result, the DNN extracts those features of the power traces that result in distinct leakage values
for every value of the secret data. This increases the risk of overfitting which is a common issue in deep learning [36].
As an example, if the power consumption is correlated with the Hw of data, the power traces measured during the
computation of X1 = 0xAA and X2 = 0x55 are similar. However, with one-hot encoding, the DNN should learn different
features from the power traces to assign X1 and X2 to different classes. In a study in [40], an MLP neural network is
trained with power traces from an ATxmega128D4 microcontroller to recover the secret key of the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES). When the MLP is used to infer the secret data with power traces collected from the same microcontroller
mounted on a different board, the accuracy of prediction drops from 88.5% to less than 13.7%. This implies overfitting in
learning the proper leakage model.
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An alternative to one-hot encoding of the secret data is using the leakage function of (1) as the labels, assuming that
the leakage model is known a priori. This results in the class of model-based DL-SCA, an example of which is introduced
in [38]. The model-based DL-SCA can recover secret data without requiring a training set, since the information about
the data leakage, that should be estimated from the training set in a profiling DL-SCA, is already incorporated in
the leakage model. Hence, the non-profiled DL-SCA of [38] does not require a training set to recover the secret data,
however, prior knowledge of the leakage model is necessary for a successful attack.
In this work, we introduce a DL-SCA technique, based on unsupervised learning, that requires neither a training
set nor a full knowledge of the leakage model. We employ an LSTM autoencoder to extract features from the power
measurements. We cluster the power features with reinforcement learning (RL) using actor-critic networks. In the
following, a brief overview on the basics of RL and the required objective functions to train the actor and critic networks
is presented. In the next section, the architecture of the autoencoder that extracts the maximum information of the
measurements is introduced.
2.4 Reinforcement Learning (RL)
Deep reinforcement learning (RL) is a class of self-supervised learning techniques to find an optimal policy of control
on an environment with high dimensional sensory inputs. RL has been using in algorithms that learn computer games,
such as Atari and Go, which exceed the performance of a human [24, 34, 35]. It has also been used in robotic navigation
and autonomous driving to learn optimal policies [13, 16].
The main concepts in the terminology of RL include the actor policy, the environment and the reward. The actor
takes actions, according to a policy, that changes the state of the environment. The policy is a learning algorithm, such
as neural networks. A reward is associated to an action for every state transition in the environment. The state of
the environment, and the corresponding reward are observed by the actor which is, in general, a high dimensional
input. The goal of RL problem is to find the optimal policy such that after a succession of actions, the actor receives the
maximum expected reward.
Let r (si ,ai ) denote the reward an actor receives by taking action ai in the state si . The goal of RL is to obtain the
maximum reward after taking a total of T actions. Hence, the instantaneous rewards associated with individual actions
is not a suitable measure for training the policy. Rather, we define the discounted reward, associated with the state st ,
as Rt =
∑T
i=t γ
i−t r (si ,ai ), in which γ is the discount factor. The discounted reward is an average of all future rewards
obtained after time step t . The optimization goal is now to maximize the mean of the discounted reward associated
with the initial state, i.e. J = E[R1], in which the expectation is over the space of all actions, rewards and states of the
environment.
Most classical RL algorithms use so-called Q-learning to optimize the policy. The Q-function, or the action-value
function, is defined in terms of the discounted reward as
Qπ (st ,at ) = Eri≥t ,si>t ,ai>t [Rt |st ,at ] (6)
In this relation π : S → P(A) is the policy function that maps the space of states to the probability distribution over
the space of actions. The Q-value, associated with a policy π , is the conditional expectation of the discounted reward
associated with action at in state st at step t , when the actions are sampled from the output of the policy π . The
expectation is over the space of future actions and states after the step t .
When the space of states and actions is finite, the Q-values of the optimal policy can be calculated using an iterative
procedure called the Bellman equation [18]. However, in the application of clustering the measurements for SCA, the
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size of state space is practically infinite, as explained later. However, Q-learning requires the discounted rewards of all
possible states. A common technique to address this issue is using a deep neural network to estimate the discounted
reward associated with an observed state. These are called deep Q-network (DQN) techniques.
The Q-value is the mean discounted reward given that action at is taken at state st . The expectation of the Q-values
over all actions in the state st is defined as the state-value, which is expressed as V π (st ) = Eat∼π [Qπ (st ,at )]. The
advantage function is then defined as
Aπ (st ,at ) = Qπ (st ,at ) −V π (st ) (7)
The advantage of action at in state st is the mean discounted reward of the action in the state minus the expectation of
the discounted reward over all actions in the state. Similar to Q-values in DQN, the state-value of an observed state can
also be estimated using neural networks. Assume the parameters of the neural network are θV . The loss function for
finding the optimal parameters is
L(θV ) = Ert ,st∼ρπ
[ (
yt −V (st |θV )
)2] (8)
in which ρπ is the visitation probability of an state with the policy π . Further,
yt = r (st ,at ) + γ ·V (st+1 |θV ) (9)
is a measure for the state-value. We note that yt also depends on the parameters θV which are usually ignored in the
optimization problem. The difference δt = yt −V (st |θV ) is called time difference (TD) error. The learning algorithms
based on minimizing the MSE of the TD error, as in (8), are called TD-learning.
The neural network used as the state-value estimator is called the critic network, for the reasons explained later.
Next, we need the proper objective for finding the optimal policy. Let the parameters of the policy neural network be
α . Policy gradient algorithms update the parameters in the direction following the gradient of the mean reward. The
gradient of the mean reward is [10]
∇α J (α) = Est∼ρπ ,at∼π
[
A(st ,at |α)∇α logπ (st ,at |α)
]
(10)
Further, it can be shown that the TD error δt is an unbiased estimate for the advantage function A(st ,at |α) [10].
Replacing the advantage function in (10) with δt provides the policy gradient for training the policy network. According
to this relation, the policy network (actor) wishes to follow the direction of the gradient. However, δt , as calculated by
the critic network, determines whether this direction achieves a higher discounted reward (δt > 0), or the opposite
direction should be taken (δt < 0). This is why the state-value estimator is called the critic network as it provides a
critique for the actions of the policy network.
3 MAXIMUM INFORMATION EXTRACTION
According to the discussion of the previous section, a necessary step in a successful SCA attack is to encode the
information content of the raw power measurements into an intermediate representation. The major reason is to capture
all information distributed over multiple dimensions, which possibly reduces the effects of noise. This step is inherent
in training the DNNs used in supervised or model-based DL-SCA; the internal neural features of the DNN include all
relevant information of the input. The autoencoder is a powerful unsupervised learning technique for encoding an
input data into an intermediate representation.
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3.1 Autoencoder
An autoencoder learns an intermediate representation of the input data bymapping the data into an internal feature space
and reconstructing the original data from the features. If the reconstruction error is small, the internal representation
includes all information about the original data. Let assume Tˆ is the input to the autoencoder which is a version of an
original data T corrupted by a random process. The autoencoder consists of an encoder e() : RN → RD which maps
the input to a D-dimensional feature space, and a decoder d() : RD → RN which maps the feature space back into the
space of original data. The encoder and decoder are parameterized byWe andWd . The optimal parameters are obtained
by minimizing a loss function E[L(T, Tˆ)].
Depending on the optimization objective, the autoencoder can be considered as different learning algorithms. The
general form of the optimization problem for a regularized autoencoder can be expressed as
e,d = arg min
e,d
E
[
L(T, Tˆ) + λR(T, Tˆ)
]
(11)
in which E[R(T, Tˆ)] is a regularization term. If the regularization term is ∂e(Tˆ)/∂Tˆ2F , as in contractive autoencoder
(CAE) [29], it learns data manifold. Due to the regularization term, the sensitivity of the encoder function on the
manifold, around which the measurements are distributed, is minimized. As a result, the autoencoder learns the normal
direction to the data manifold. The denoising autoencoder (DAE) [39] does not include an explicit regularization
term. The autoencoder is optimized with a training set consisting of the original data and the corresponding version
corrupted with a random process. The function L is the cross-entropy loss for binary data. The training set regularizes
the autoencoder, implicitly. Further, [1] has introduced the reconstruction contractive auto-encoder (RCAE) with the
regularization on the encoder and decoder function composition, i.e. r () = d ◦ e(). It is shown a Gaussian process, the
RCAE learns the score function from which the input distribution can be estimated. In the following, we demonstrate
that using the maximum likelihood criterion as the optimization goal, and minimizing the entropy as the regularization,
the autoencoder extracts the maximum information from the input.
The goal of a maximum information autoencoder is to extract features f ∈ RD from the corrupted measurements Tˆ
which have the highest mutual information with the original data T. Formally, we want to find the optimal parameters
We of an encoder function e() to maximize
I (T; f) = H (T) − H (T|f) (12)
In the above equation, H (T) is the Shannon entropy of the original data which is independent of the parametersWe .
Hence, the optimal encoder parameters can be obtained by minimizing the conditional entropy. Using the definition of
the conditional entropy into the above equation, and considering that the output of the decoder is an estimate of the
original data, we have
Wˆe = arg max
We ,p˜
E(T,f)[log p˜(T|f)] (13)
We note that the conditional probability function p˜(T|f) is restricted by the structure of the decoder. Hence, to find
the optimal parameters of the encoder, the optimization problem of (13) must be solved over all possible conditional
probability density functions p˜. With the restricted decoder structure, the criterion in (13) is a lower bound on the
conditional entropy of (12).
An alternative perspective to the optimization problem of the maximum information autoencoder is obtained by
replacing the the conditional distribution p˜(T|f) in (13) with pˆ(Tˆ|T;We ,Wd )pˆ(T;We ,Wd ). In this relation, The variable f
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is replaced by the measurements Tˆ as f = e(Tˆ) is a deterministic function given the parameters of the encoder. Further,
the parametersWe andWd are explicitly shown to emphasize that the distributions are restricted by the encoder and
decoder structures. Using this replacement, the optimum parameters of the autoencoder are obtained as
Wˆe ,Wˆd = arg max
We ,Wd
E(T, Tˆ)
[
log pˆ(Tˆ|T;We ,Wd )+ log pˆ(T;We ,Wd )
]
= arg max
We ,Wd
{
E(T, Tˆ)
[
log pˆ(Tˆ|T;We ,Wd )
] −H (T)} (14)
The first term in this optimization goal is the conditional likelihood of the measurements given the original data. The
second term is the Shannon entropy of the original data as reconstructed by the decoder. Comparing (14) with (11),
the maximum information autoencoder can be considered as a regularized maximum likelihood problem in which the
regularization is minimizing the entropy of reconstruction.
The maximum likelihood criterion reduces to mean squared error with Gaussian distribution. Considering that the
corruption process in the measurements is the additive Gaussian noise, we have Tˆ = T + N, in which N ∼ N(0, Σ) and
Σ is the covariance of the noise. The general form of a multivariate Gaussian distribution with N variables with the
mean vector µ and covariance matrix C is
f (Y; µ,C) = 1√
(2π )N |C |
e−(Y−µ)tC−1(Y−µ) (15)
in which |C | is the determinant of C . With this definition, the conditional Tˆ|T is p(Tˆ|T) = f (Tˆ;T, Σ). By using this
distribution in the regularized maximum likelihood problem of (14), we obtain
Wˆe ,Wˆd = arg min
We ,Wd
{
E(T, Tˆ)
[(Tˆ − T)T Σ−1(Tˆ − T)] + H (T)} = arg min
We ,Wd
{
E
[∥Tˆ − T∥2] + H (T)} (16)
The second equality holds for stationary measurement noise. As a result, for Gaussian noise, the optimization problem
of a max information autoencoder reduces to minimizing both the mean squared error (MSE) between the input and
output of the autoencoder and the entropy of the output.
The Shannon entropy is a logarithmic function of the distributions which is sensitive to estimation errors. Hence,
the entropy term in the optimization objective of (16) makes the training process of the autoencoder difficult. In the
following, we demonstrate that a constraint on the dimension of the feature space f , i.e. D, set a constraint on the
entropy. As a result, minimizing the entropy can be achieved by hyperparameter tuning in the autoencoder, in which
the hyperparameter is the dimension of the feature space. We show that the constraint on the feature dimension results
in a limit on the number of degrees of freedom in the reconstruction, thus, the entropy.
3.2 Number of Degrees of Freedom (NDF)
We demonstrate that the dimension of autoencoder features limit the NDF of reconstructed power traces, which in
turn reduces the entropy and filters high frequency components. In estimation theory, the NDF refers to the number of
independent variables that represent a random process, or a set of measurements. The NDF is also closely related to the
information content of the measurements. In the following, we also show that NDF is inversely proportional to low
frequency components of the measurements.
A convenient definition for the NDF in a random process, useful for empirical purposes, based on the sample moments
is provided in [14]. Let T = {ti |i = 0, 1, · · · ,N − 1} denote the samples of an ergodic random processT [n] in an interval
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of length N . Them-th moment of the random process in the interval can be calculated as
Sm (N ) =
N∑
i=0
tmi /N (17)
Them-th order NDF of the random process in the interval of length N is defined as
km (N ) = Var {Tm [n]}/Var {Sm (N )} (18)
in which Var {.} is the variance. This definition holds for a random process T [n] that is ergodic regarding them-th
moment. As a result, limN→∞ 1/km (N ) = 0 which implies that them-th sample moment converges to the ensemble
moment in mean.
Next, we show that the first order NDF, as defined in (18), is directly proportional to the Fisher information of an
ergodic Gaussian process. The Fisher information around the first moment of a random process T with likelihood
function f (T; µT ,CT ) is defined as
I1 = −E
[ ∂2
∂µ2
log f (T; µT ,CT )
]
(19)
Using the density function in (15), it can be shown that the above equation reduces to the sum of the elements in the
inverse covariance matrix. By denoting C−1T = [ai j ], we have I1 =
∑
i
∑
j ai j . Using this property, we can express the
Fisher information in terms of the frequency spectral components of the random process.
The frequency spectrum of the random process can be obtained as the Fourier transform of the covariance func-
tion. Expressing the Fourier transform as the matrixW with elements wk,s = exp{−j2πks/N }, the spectrum of the
random process in an interval of length N , with covariance matrix CT , can be obtained as ΩT =WCTW H /N . In this
representation, ΩT is a diagonal matrix with the diagonal elements ωi , i = 0, 1, · · · ,N − 1 equal to the frequency
spectral components of the random process. We note that the columns of the Fourier transformationW constitute an
orthonormal basis. Accordingly, the spectrum of the inverse covariance matrix is Ω−1T =WC
−1
T W
H /N . As a result, the
Fisher information in (19) for a Gaussian process can be obtained as
I1 =
∑
i
∑
j
ai j =
∑
i
∑
j
ai j ·w0iw∗0j = N · ω−10 (20)
Since ω0 is an eigenvalue of the covariance matrix CT , corresponding to the Fourier transform basis, we can show
that ω0 is the sum of elements in CT , due to the the symmetric Toeplitz property of the covariance matrix. Using this
property and equation (20), it is shown in [14] that k1(N ) = σ 2T I1, with the NDF k1(N ) is defined in (18). In other words,
the first order NDF of the random process is proportional to the Fisher information.
The interpretation of the above discussion in the context of the autoencoder follows. First, we note that the first
order sample moment of the random process T [n] in (17) is an estimate for the mean of the process with N samples.
Hence, Var {S1(N )} is the variance of the estimation error, or the power of error. On the other hand Var {T [n]} is the
total power (variance) of the process. Therefore, the NDF of (18) is related to the signal-to-noise ratio. We also showed
that the signal-to-noise ratio is proportional to the Fisher information with the proportionality constant equal to the
power of the process.
Additional insight into the NDF is obtained using the frequency spectrum of the covariance. The Fourier transform
of the covariance matrix decomposes the random process into components based on the correlation time. The first
component, i.e.ω0, refers to the correlation time of the DC component in the process; Largerω0 implies that the samples
Manuscript submitted to ACM
SCARL: Side-Channel Analysis with Reinforcement Learning on the Ascon Authenticated Cipher 13
of the process are correlated over a larger time interval. According to (20) and k1(N ) = σ 2T I1, larger correlation time
implies lower NDF. Hence, the autoencoder smoothes the measurements.
In an autoencoder, the output is reconstructed from a feature of dimensions D. Hence, the NDF of the reconstructed
process is limited by D; using smaller D results in larger correlation time of the reconstruction. Let T˜ denote the output
of the autoencoder, which follows a multivariate Gaussian distribution with the mean µ˜ and covariance matrix C˜ .
According to the distribution (15), the Shannon entropy H (T˜) can be found as the mean of et C˜e, in which e = T˜ − µ˜ is
the variation around the mean. The term e = T˜ − µ˜ can be considered as the sum of the powers of the variation e over
the spectral components ωi , i = 0, 1, · · · ,N − 1. Lower NDF implies that the higher frequency components ωi , i > 0 are
attenuated. Hence, the autoencoder filters out high frequency components, and thus acts as a denoising filter. This
results in lower entropy E[et C˜e].
The constraint on the dimension of the features space in the autoencoder provides a trade-off between the bias and
the variance of the estimation. We note that the entropy of reconstruction is due to the measurement noise, but also the
information of the measurements about the secret data. Lower dimension results in larger bias, as the DC component
of the random process is larger. Hence, part of the information about the data might be missed. However, the higher
frequency components, mostly contributed by the measurement noise, are reduced which results in smaller variance.
To achieve the minimum MSE in estimating the original data T, the dimension of the feature space should be adjusted
properly such as the total error, due to both bias and variance, is minimized.
3.3 LSTM Autoenconder
Recurrent neural networks (RNN) has been used mainly in learning temporal models of signals in a wide range of
applications including natural language processing (NLP) [46], sequence labeling, speech recognition and acoustic
modeling [32]. The long short-term memory (LSTM) neural network is a special type of RNN that can learn short-term
as well as long-term temporal model of a signal.
The basic block of an LSTM neural network is shown in Fig. 2. The internal state of the cell encoding information of
the input is c while h is the output at every time instance. The internal state and the output, with equal dimensions, are
not bounded by a non-linear activation. In order to generate outputs with different dimensions from the internal state
and possibly processed by a non-linear activation, additional neurons are used at the output of the cell. As shown in Fig.
2, a fully connected (FC) layer is added at the output of the cell for this purpose.
A fully connected (FC) layer at the input of the LSTM cell processes the input data. The activation function of the
neurons in this layer is tanh. The internal state of the cell operate as a memory; a weighted sum of the state at the
previous times and the input at the current time update the state. The weight of the previous state and the input are
determined by forget gate and input gate, respectively, which also determine the memory of the cell. The output of the
cell, i.e. ht , is generated from the internal state, by applying tanh activation first, and then processing the result by
output gate, which controls the information flow from state to the output. The weights of the three gates, described
above, are determined by three FC units with sigmoid activation.
As discussed in Section 3.1, the structure of the auto-encoder constrains the space of extracted features, hence, a
trade-off between variance and bias of estimation. Consequently, the proper structure has a significant role in the
success of an unsupervised power analysis. Due to the special properties of LSTM networks in extracting temporal
information, we propose an LSTM autoencoder to extract data-dependent features of power traces. The autoencoder is
shown in Fig. 2. The encoder and decoder are LSTM networks shown in a time-unrolled representation; each of the
encoder and decoder consists of a single LSTM cell, however, multiple cells shown in this representation correspond
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Fig. 2. Proposed LSTM auto-encoder for extracting features of power traces, with sliding window processing of input power trace and
c state of top encoder cell selected as power feature.
to successive time instants that a cell process the input samples. A single linear neuron is used at the output of the
decoder cell to generate samples of a power trace.
The raw power traces are first processed by a sliding window of lengthW and stride S as shown in Fig. 2. The input
vector to the encoder LSTM cell at every time instant is theW samples of successive windows. The process of the
sliding window is similar to a convolution layer in CNNs. For faster convergence of the learning process, we also feed
the samples of the input power traces to the input of the decoder. The output of the decoder are processed by a single
neuron, with linear activation function, to generate the reconstructed power traces, in the reverse order.
We use the MSE between the intput and output of the autoencoder as the loss function for updating the weights
of the encoder/decoder cells. The regularization on the learning process is achieved by tuning the dimension of the
internal state as the hyperparameter. The features extracted from the input power traces, are the internal state c of the
encoder LSTM cell.
4 SCAWITH REINFORCEMENT LEARNING (SCARL)
After encoding the information measurements into an intermediate representation, i.e. the autoencoder features, we
need a statistic to extract information about the secret data. However, we note that not all all of the features of the
autoencoder necessarily relate to the secret data. They include information about all underlying processes of the
hardware running in parallel with the cipher operation under attack, including the state machine, clock tree and the
peripheral circuitry. The information about the secret data is encoded into at least one of the features.
According to the discussion of Section 2.1, inter-cluster difference refers to the information content of the measure-
ments about the secret data. Using reinforcement learning (RL) we divide the features of power traces into two clusters
such that at least one of the features exhibits the highest inter-cluster difference. Next, we identify the particular feature
which corresponds to the secret data. SCARL operates in two steps:
(1) Pronounced Features: The features of power traces are divided into two clusters satisfying two conditions: 1)
the features are evenly distributed over the clusters, and 2) the inter-cluster difference on the mean of at least
one feature is maximized. We postulate that at least one of the features with large, but not necessarily the largest,
inter-cluster difference corresponds to the secret data.
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Fig. 3. Two hidden layer MLP networks used as the actor and critic neural networks for clustering power features with reinforcement
learning.
(2) Leakage Estimation:We label the two clusters as {0, 1}. We estimate the coefficients of the generic leakage
model in (1) such that the leakage values are equal to the labels of the clusters. We postulate that the correct key
corresponds to a leakage model in which the low order terms have the largest contribution to the leakage.
4.1 Actor-Critic Networks
In this section, we provide a formulation for the problem of clustering the power features in the context of reinforcement
learning. We use the actor-critic network using the TD advantage learning algorithms, with the objective functions (8)
and (10), to assign the power features to two clusters. For this purpose, we provide the following definitions.
• Actor Policy: It is a neural network that classifies the power features into two clusters with labels {0, 1}.
The action is the class assignment. The output of the neural network is the mean and variance of a Gaussian
distribution that defines the stochastic policy.
• Environment: The environment consists of the set of power features grouped into two clusters. The state of
the environment is the mean difference between the features in the clusters.
• Reward: The reward is composed of two terms. One term is the maximum inter-cluster difference of the mean
features. The second term measures the even assignment of features into the clusters.
The architecture of the actor and critic networks are shown in Fig. 3. Both networks are multi-layer perceptrons
(MLP) with two hidden layers. Each hidden layer consists of 512 and 256 neurons in the actor and critic networks,
respectively. The activation function of the hidden layers is ReLU. The output layer of the actor network consists of two
neurons with sigmoid activation. These neurons correspond to the mean µ and variance σ of a Gaussian distribution
from which the actions are sampled. The input of the actor network is the features of the power traces, obtained by the
autoencoder.
Assume a number of S power traces Tj with the corresponding features cj , j = 1, 2, · · · , S are available. The vectors
cj are the internal state of the LSTM autoencoder described in Section 3.3, which are not bounded by a non-linear
activation function. Usually, the training of neural networks are successful if the inputs are normalized. Hence, we
calculate the normalized power features as
f˜j =
cj − Ej [cj ]
max
j
(cj ) − min
j
(cj ) (21)
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in which the expectation, min and max functions are element-wise. The normalized power features f˜j are used as the
input of the actor network. The corresponding outputs of the actor are µ j ,σj , j = 1, 2, · · · , S . The class assignment of
every power feature f˜j is then sampled from the Gaussian distribution with the mean and variance equal to µi and σj ,
respectively. In other words, aj ∼ N(µi ,σj ) determines the cluster of the j-th power measurement.
Assume that we intend to divide the power features into two clusters C0 and C1. Using the outputs of the actor
network, if aj < 0.5, we assign f˜j ∈ C0 and if aj > 0.5 then f˜j ∈ C1. Next, we define the state of the environment. Given
the actions of the actor network is aj at time step t , the state is the mean difference between the power features in two
clusters, i.e.
st = Ecj ∈C0
[
cj
] − Ecj ∈C1 [cj ] (22)
The state is the input to the critic. Similar to the actor, we need to normalize the input of the critic network. Hence, we
use s˜t = st /(max(st ) − min(st )) as the input of the critic.
At every state of the environment, we need to define a reward associated with a action. We define a reward comprised
of two terms measuring how well the actor separates the power traces and how evenly distribute them in the clusters.
Let |Ck |,k = 0, 1 denote the size of the clusters. We define the percentage of the clusters as pk = |Ck |/S,k = 0, 1. We
recall that S is the total number of measurements. If the power features are evenly distributed, then p0 = p1 = 0.5. We
use the Kullback-Leibler (K-L) divergence between the distribution P = {p0,p1} and uniform distribution to measure
the even assignment of clusters. The reward is then
r (st ,at ) = max(|st |) − DKL(Q | |P) (23)
in which |st | is the absolute value of the mean difference between the clusters, as defined in (22). The first term of the
reward measures the inter-cluster difference. The second term DKL(Q | |P) = −(1 + EQ [log P]) is the K-L divergence
between P = {p0,p1} and the uniform distribution Q = {0.5, 0.5}.
The actor and critic MLP networks are trained using the objective functions defined in Section 2.4. At every time step
t , the power features are assigned to either of two clusters C0 and C1 by the stochastic actor policy, as described above.
The new state and and the associated reward are calculated using (22) and (23), respectively. The target state-value yt
and the corresponding TD error δt are calculated according to (9). The critic MLP is updated by minimizing the loss
function (8). Finally, the parameters of the actor MLP are updated according to (10). The procedure continues until the
obtained reward does not change significantly.
4.2 Leakage Estimation
The RL-based clustering algorithm, in the previous section, detects the pronounced features of power measurements,
i.e. those features that exhibits the highest inter-cluster difference. At least one of these features corresponds to the
secret data. To identify which feature contains information about the secret data, we first estimate a non-linear leakage
model for all key candidates. The key candidate that exhibits the highest inter-cluster difference with lower order terms
is the correct key.
Assume the value lj is the action assigned by the actor MLP to the power feature cj . Hence, lj refers to the likelihood
that the feature belongs to a cluster. Let Z j denote the (known) input data to the cipher operation under attack associated
with the power feature cj . for every key candidate k∗, the secret data X ∗j corresponding to the power feature cj is
calculated as X ∗j = Fk∗ (Z j ). This is described in Section 2.1. Now, the coefficients of the generic leakage model (1) is
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Fig. 4. The Sponge structure of Ascon authenticated cipher with four stages of key insertion (Initialization), associated data, plaintext
and tag generation [27]
estimated for the key candidate k∗ using MSE; i.e.,
α∗U = minαU
Ej
[ |L(X ∗j ) − lj |2] , U ∈ Fm2 (24)
For anm-bit secret data X , the highest order of the leakage model is m. We postulate that the components of the
leakage model with order d = HW (U ) ≤ m0 withm0 < m have the largest contribution to the leakage. Hence, we set
α∗U = 0,HW (U ) > m0 and find the low order leakage as
l∗j = α
∗
0 +
∑
U ∈Fm2 \{0},HW (U )≤m0
α∗U (X ∗j )U (25)
Now, we recluster the power features based on this low order model. We calculate the mean of the leakage as µ∗l = Ej [l∗j ],
and define the clusters C∗0 = {cj |l∗j > µ∗l } and C∗0 = {cj |l∗j < µ∗l }. The rank of key candidate k∗ is thus
R(k∗) = max Ecj ∈C∗0 [cj ] − Ecj ∈C∗1 [cj ] (26)
5 SCARL ATTACK ON ASCON
The Ascon authenticated cipher employs the so-called sponge construction as shown in Fig. 4 [8]. The internal 320-
bit secret state of Ascon is arranged into five words of length 64 bits, denoted by x0, x1, x2, x3 and x4. In a sponge
construction, usually, the first r bits of the state are called the rate bits and the remaining c = 320 − r bits are the
capacity. The r -bit blocks of associated data and the plaintext are added to the rate bits and the blocks of ciphertext are
squeezed out of the same bits of the state. The unexposed capacity bits are mixed with the rate bits, to increase the
entropy, during several rounds of permutation. The capacity of a sponge-based cipher is proportional to the privacy
and authentication security bounds [30].
To run an authenticated encryption for a plaintext with associated data, the state of Ascon is initialized with a 128-bit
nonce, the 128-bit secret key and a 64-bit fixed initial vector (IV). Next, a rounds of permutations are conducted on the
state in the Initialization stage. The permutation function consists of the non-linear S-box operation, on a 5-bit vertical
slice of the state, followed by the linear diffusion function, that combines the bits within a word of the state. The flow
of the permutation function in the first round of the Initialization stage is shown in Fig. 6. The first state word x0 is
initialized with the fixed IV. The bits of secret key K = (k0,k1, · · · ,k127) are loaded into the next two words of the state,
and the bits of nonce n = (n0,n1, · · · ,n127) initialize the last two words.
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Fig. 5. S-box operation and diffusion over the 320-bit state initialized with nonce, secret key and IV, at the beginning of Initialization
stage of Ascon. The power consumption during S-box computations is used in the SCA attack.
5.1 Attack Implementation
In the context of the attack model described in Section 2.1, the 5-bit S-box operations of Ascon, at the beginning of the
Initialization stage, are the targets of our PA attack. At the beginning of Initialization, the most significant bit (MSB)
at the input of the i-th S-box is the i-th bit of the IV which is known. The next two bits of the input are bits ki and
ki+64 of the secret key, respectively. The two least significant bits (LSB) of the input are bits ni and ni+64 of the public
message number, or nonce. We measure the power consumption of the S-box computation for multiple values of nonce.
The known input data to the S-box i is a 2-bit variable Zi ∈ F22 = (ni ,ni+64) corresponding to two bits of the nonce.
The secret data Xi ∈ F52 is the 5-bit variable at the output of the S-box. The subset of the key that is estimated using the
power consumption of S-box i is k = (ki ,ki+64).
We implemented the Ascon authenticated cipher on an Artix-7 FPGA; the implementation is available for inspection
at [33]. The implementation is lightweight as it includes only one instantiation of the S-box hardware shared by all
64 S-box operations in Ascon. The S-box hardware is a bit-sliced implementation. After initializing the 320-bit state,
the S-box operations in a round of permutation are conducted during the next 64 clock cycles, with one operation at
every cycle. This implementation is consistent with the flow of operations shown in Fig. 6. We measure the power
consumption during S-box computations using the Flexible Open-source workBench fOr Side-channel analysis (FOBOS)
[5].
Our FOBOS instance include a NewAE CW305 Artix-7 FPGA which executes the hardware implementation of the
Ascon. This FPGA board is the target of the PA attack. In addition, FOBOS uses Digilent Nexys A7 as a control board
for synchronizing the target with a host PC. The control board receives the input data, for encryption/decryption, from
the PC and generates the proper signals for the clock and configuration of the target board. The power consumption of
the target board during multiple encryptions, with random nonce values, is measured using a PicoScope 5000 with 20
dB amplification and 125 samples per clock cycle. The clock of the measurements is synchronized with the clock of the
control board.
5.2 SCARL Attack
The first step in the SCARL attack is mapping the power measurements into an intermediate representation using the
autoencoder. The power traces collected during the first round of Initialization, using FOBOS in our implementation of
Ascon, include 64 times 125 consecutive samples corresponding to the power consumption of 64 S-box computations. If
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Fig. 6. Horizontal processing of power measurements for separating power traces associated with individual S-boxes as the input to
the autoencoder.
we know the rough timing of S-box operations, we can separate the power traces corresponding to the individual S-box
operations in the entire power collected during round one of Initialization.
We take l samples of the power measurements centered at time instant ri as the power trace corresponding to the
i-th S-box. This is shown in Fig. 6. As mentioned earlier, each S-box computation is carried out in one clock cycle and
125 power samples are collected per cycle. Hence, the power traces of individual S-boxes has a size of 125 samples.
However, we take the window length l = 125 + ∆l to address the uncertainty in locating the time of a S-box operation.
We emphasize that the resolution of FOBOS is sufficiently high to accurately identify the time of all operations of the
cipher. However, to demonstrate the power of SCARL in extracting data-dependent features, even with misaligned
traces, we add the uncertainty ∆l in locating the power traces of individual S-boxes.
All power traces of an S-box, measured during multiple encryptions, can be used at the input of the LSTM autoencoder,
described in Section 3.3, to obtain the corresponding features. However, it is more efficient to use collective power traces
of multiple S-boxes, as the size of data has a regularization effect in the learning process of the neural network. Assume
we collect power measurements for N encryptions. If we use the power traces of 2 S-boxes collectively, the autoencoder
will be trained with a data set of size 2N , i.e. twice the number of encryptions. Although the measurements of more
than 2 S-boxes can be used collectively, due to memory limitations of the program running the neural networks, we use
the power traces of pairs of S-boxes for extracting features by the autoencoder.
To map power traces into the autoencoder feature space, we need to tune the dimension of the features. The dimension
is the number of neurons in the FC components of the LSTM cell in (2). The mean and variance of the collective power
traces corresponding to a pair of S-boxes for 30K encryptions is shown in Fig. 7 (a). To make an estimate for the number
of degrees of freedom (NDF), we take a window of lengthWL around a power sample i . We calculate the spectrum
of the covariance matrix of the samples in the window. According to the discussion of Section 3.2, we find the NDF
corresponding to sample i asWLσ 2i /ω0, in which σ 2i is the variance of the sample andω0 is the DC frequency component
of the spectrum. The calculated NDF for different window lengthsWL = 45, 50, 55 is shown in Fig. 7 (b).
We set the dimension of the features in the LSTM autoencoder of Fig. 2 to D = 150. Hence, the NDF of the
reconstructed power traces will be limited to 150. It is observed in Fig. 7 that The NDF of samples with higher variance
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Fig. 7. Statistical moments of power traces during S-box computations of Ascon; (a) mean and variance, and (b) number of degrees of
freedom (NDF).
increases beyond 150 when the window length around the samples is larger thanWL = 45. This implies that the
autoencoder smoothes variations with correlations times shorter than 45 samples.
The features of the power traces, with dimension D = 150, are clustered by the actor-critic network of 3. The inputs
to the networks, thus, have a dimension of 150, as shown in the figure. A low order leakage model is estimated that fits
the clusters for every key candidate, as described in Section 4.2. The highest order of a generic leakage model for the
5-bit Ascon S-box is equal to 5. We limit the order of the estimated leakage model to 2. Hence, the estimated leakage
model of (25) will be a second order model.
6 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We demonstrate the SCARL attack in recovering the secret key of the Ascon authenticated cipher from power consump-
tion of the S-box operations at the beginning of the Initialization stage. The attack setup is described in Section 5.1. The
power traces are measured at the supply pin of the target FPGA executing the Ascon implementation.
We implement the neural networks using Tensorflow on a PCwith Intel Core-i7 CPU, 16 GB RAM, and Nvidia GeForce
GTX 1080 GPU. The LSTM autoencoder takes 5 minutes to extract features of 60K power traces, which correspond
to the power traces of a pair of S-boxes. The actor-critic networks for clustering the power features take 3 minutes.
The rest of the SCARL algorithm, including low order leakage estimation and reclustering, for all key candidates, is
completed in less than a minute for 60K traces, corresponding to a pair of S-boxes. Using two S-boxes, 4 bits of the
secret key are unknown. As a result, the time required for SCARL to find 4 bits of the secret key is about 8 minutes.
6.1 Classical DPA and CPA
To compare the efficiency and power of a SCARL attack with existing SCA techniques, we also conducted DPA and
CPA attacks on the Ascon implementation. In contrast to supervised learning SCA, DPA and CPA can be considered
as unsupervised techniques if the attacker has a full knowledge of the leakage model. We demonstrate that SCARL
significantly outperforms DPA and CPA attacks even though it does not require a leakage model.
The DPA attack is conductedwith two commonly used leakagemodels, i.e. Hammingweight (Hw) andmost significant
bit (MSB). In the Hw model, the leakage of secret data in (1) is LHw (X ) = ∑i xi , in which X = (x0,x1, · · · ,x4) are the
5-bit values at the output of the S-boxes under attack. Using the MSB model, the leakage is simply LMSB = x0. In a
DPA attack, the power traces are grouped into two clusters based on the leakage.
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Fig. 8. Statistical moments of power traces during S-box computations of Ascon; (a) mean and variance, and (b) number of degrees of
freedom (NDF).
We collected power measurements of the FPGA for 40K encryptions with random nonce values. Let Tj denote
the power measurements during encryption with the corresponding nonce value nj = (nj,0,nj,1,nj,2, · · · ,nj,127) for
j = 1, 2, · · · , 40K . For the DPA attack, we separated the power traces of S-boxes 0 and 1. Hence, a total of 80K power
traces Tˆj , j = 1, 2, · · · , 80K are available, in which the first 40K traces correspond to S-box 0 and the rest to S-box 1. The
corresponding input data are denoted by Z j = (nj,0,nj,64), j = 1, 2, · · · , 40K and Z j = (nj,1,nj,65), j = 40K + 1, 40K +
2, · · · , 80K . The subset of the secret key (key candidate) that is estimated using this attack is k = (k0,k64,k1,k64), with
16 possible values.
For every value of the key candidate k = k∗, we calculate the output of the S-boxes. The output values X ∗j , j =
1, 2, · · · , 80K are calculated with k∗ and the corresponding Z j . The values of data leakage are then calculated as LG(X ∗j ),
in which G is either Hw or MSB. Let µ∗L denote the mean of the calculated leakage values. Next, we assign power traces
with LG(X ∗j ) < µ∗L to clusterC∗0 and traces with LG(X ∗j ) > µ∗L to clusterC∗1 . Finally, we calculate the difference between
the mean traces in the two clusters. The sample with the highest difference is the rank of key candidate k∗.
The result of the DPA attack using Hw and MSB leakage models is shown in Fig. 8 (a). It is observed that with the
Hw leakage model there are 7 incorrect key candidates with a higher rank than the correct key. However, with the MSB
model, the rank of the correct key is among the top 4 key candidates. We note that rank of the correct key and the
key candidate 8 are equal in this case. These results imply that the power consumption of S-boxes in Ascon are more
correlated with the MSB of the output values.
The CPA attack is similar to DPA but with different rank statistics. Given the power traces Tˆj , j = 1, 2, · · · , 80K
and the calculated leakage values LG(X ∗j ) > µ∗L , as described above, the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the
samples of the power traces and the leakage values is used to rank the key candidate k∗. The sample with the highest
absolute value of the correlation coefficient determines the rank of the key. The results of the CPA attack are shown in
part (b) of Fig. 8. Similar to DPA, the MSB leakage model shows improved performance. However, there are still two
incorrect key candidates with higher rank than the correct key with 40K power measurements. Again, the incorrect key
8 has the same rank as the correct key.
6.2 Results of SCARL
The first step in SCARL attack is to map the raw power traces into an intermediate representation that captures the
information content of all samples in the measurements. We use the LSTM autoencoder of Fig. 2, with 150 neurons in
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Fig. 9. Performance of LSTM autoencoder in mapping measured power traces into the internal feature space; (a) MSE versus epochs
of learning, and (b) measured power and reconstructed trace by the autoencoder.
Fig. 10. Obtained reward during successive steps of learning with the actor-critic networks and TD advantage learning for clustering
power features.
the FC components of the encoder/decoder cells, for this purpose. To find the optimal weights of the neural networks,
we use the Adaptive moment estimation (Adam) algorithm for updating the weights using the MSE objective, described
in Section 3.1. We use the batch normalization method with a batch size of 512.
The raw power traces at the input of the autoencoder are normalized such that all samples of the traces are within
[−1, 1]. For a power trace Tˆ = {ti |i = 0, 1, · · · ,N }, the normalized trace T˜ is obtained by subtracting the mean Ei [ti ]
from T and then dividing the result by maxi (ti ) − mini (ti ). As shown in Fig. 2, the normalized power traces are first
processed by a sliding window. We select windows of lengthW = 10 and stride S = 5. The 10 samples in t-th window
are the input to the encoder cell at time instant t . The MSE of the autoencoder during successive epochs of learning is
shown in Fig. 9 (a).
The MSE of Fig. 9 (a) corresponds to the last batch of data at every learning epoch. It is observed that the variation of
MSE is almost stabilized after 22 epochs. We stop the learning process at epoch 25. The reconstructed power trace, at the
output of the decoder, for one measured power trace is shown in part (b) of the figure. We observe that the autoencoder
identifies the major features of the power traces while high frequency variations, i.e. with lower correlation time, are
filtered.
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Fig. 11. Rank of key candidates in SCARL attack; (a) inter-cluster difference of power features with the correct key and the incorrect
key with highest rank; (b) rank of key candidates versus the number of power measurements.
The extracted power features by the autoencoder are clustered by the actor-critic networks of Fig. 3 based on the
rewards defined in Section 4.1. According to (23), the two components of the reward measure the mean inter-cluster
difference of the features in two clusters and the even assignment of features to the clusters. The total reward and the
mean inter-cluster difference of features at successive steps of learning are shown in Fig. 10. The difference between
these two curves is the reward component measuring the even assignment of clusters.
At the initial steps of learning the total reward is negative with large variations, as shown in Fig. 10. This means that
the assignment of power features to the clusters is not even. Further, the inter-cluster difference is low which implies
that the actor has not learned the pronounced features. When learning proceeds, the inter-cluster difference reward
improves. Although this reward is almost stable during intermediate learning steps, the total reward is much smaller
than the inter-cluster reward until step 300. This implies that the features are not evenly distributed over different
clusters. After step 300, total reward is almost equal to the inter-cluster difference, i.e. the cluster assignment is now
even, while the rewards are also stable. We stop the learning process at step 350.
After clustering the power features, a low order leakage model is estimated for every key candidate, as described
in Section 4.2. The power features are reclustered with this leakage model. The maximum mean difference of the
features between two clusters is our rank statistics for the key candidates. The mean difference of power features,
clustered with the low order leakage model, for the correct key and the incorrect key with the highest rank, for 30K
measurements, is shown in Fig. 11 (a). In the same figure (right axis), the mean difference of features in clusters as
found by the reinforcement learning algorithm, is also shown. We note that the maximum feature of the correct key
coincides with the maximum inter-cluster difference obtained by RL. It implies that the RL algorithm has identified the
information about the secret data from the power measurements.
The rank of key candidates versus the number of power measurements (encryptions) is also shown in Fig. 11 (b).
If at least 24K measurements are collected, SCARL is able to identify the correct key. In this figure, the rank of key
candidate corresponding to 4 bits of the secret key at the input of S-boxes 0 and 1 is plotted. This is in contrast to the
results of DPA and CPA attacks, in Fig. 8, which fail to identify the correct key with 40K measurements.
7 CONCLUSIONS
We demonstrated the application of deep reinforcement learning to develop a method of deep learning side-channel
analysis, called SCARL, that extracts information about the secret data in a self-supervised approach. SCARL encodes
the information content of all samples of power measurements into the internal representation of an autoencoder. We
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employed reinforcement learning, using actor-critic networks, to cluster the power features. Assuming that lower order
terms of a generic leakage model have higher data leakage, SCARL can identify the proper leakage model from the
clusters. We also demonstrated that SCARL is highly efficient compared to model-based attacks. With a lightweight
implementation of the Ascon authenticated cipher on the Artix-7 FPGA, SCARL is able to recover the secret key using
power measurements during 24K encryptions, while DPA and CPA attacks, with Hw and MSB leakage models, were
unable to recover the key with 40K encryptions.
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